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In dealing with disputes over ownership of the family home, the cases illustrate the tendency of the courts to blur the distinction between these two types of trusts.
However, the historical origin of each is distinctly different. A resulting trust arises where, for example, title to the property is vested in A's name but the consideration was provided by B. Unless a contrary intention is proved, the property will be held by A on resulting trust for B to the extent of his contribution.
iii This causal connection between the financial contributions and acquisition of an equitable interest has been described as the 'solid tug of money'. iv It becomes evident in the following discussion that the 'solid tug of money' is central in determining beneficial ownership of the family home. In contrast, constructive trusts have always been seen as arising by way operation of the law rather than the intentions of the parties. In the context of the family home, the courts have evinced a willingness to impose a constructive trust to prevent fraudulent or unconscionable conduct. Prior to Lloyds Bank v Rosset v , it was evident that two lines of authority emerged from the cases. The first line of authority, illustrated by cases like Gissing v Gissing vi and Pettitt v Pettitt vii , was based on the 'solid tug of money', which followed closely the resulting trust analysis, in that, there had to be a direct referability between financial contributions and the acquisition of the property. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the prima facie inference is that it is the common intention of the parties that any contributions made towards the total purchase price of the property would entitle the party making the contribution to a proportionate share in the property. The second line of authority is found in cases like Eves v Eves viii and Grant v Edwards ix . The constructive trust is imposed on the grounds of 'fairness' or 'justice' which suggests the courts' willingness to impose a constructive trust in situations where the claimant is able to establish that the defendant has either explicitly promised to share the property or at least acknowledged in some way the intention to share and the claimant has, in reliance on this promise, acted to his or her detriment.
x In Rosset, the defendant had made indirect contributions in the form of supervising building works and doing some redecoration on the husband's property. She attempted to resist the bank's claim on the grounds that, following Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland xi , the bank was bound by her equitable interest under a constructive trust since they had failed to obtain her consent to the mortgage. The
House of Lords, in dismissing the defendant's claim, stated that a claimant may acquire a beneficial interest under a constructive trust only if two key elements are established: common intention to share and detrimental reliance. The claimant must establish the existence of an agreement, arrangement or understanding reached by the parties for the sharing of the property and that (s)he has acted to his or her detriment in reliance on such agreement, arrangement or understanding. In the absence of an express common intention, such intention may be inferred from the parties' conduct. In that respect, direct financial contributions to the purchase price, whether initially or subsequently towards mortgage payments, would readily justify such an inference. xii It is, however, suggested that the common intention approach is inadequate in dealing with family property disputes primarily for two reasons. Firstly, Rosset reveals the inextricable 'solid tug of money' in founding a proprietary claim and shifts the emphasis back to financial contributions which are directly referable to the acquisition of the property. This is where a major weakness of the common intention approach lies. It fails to take into account the economic inequality between men and women which, in turn, affects their respective ability to acquire property.
This inequality is not just limited to the disparity of earnings between men and women but also affects women's access to the family wealth.
Secondly, the law fails to take into account the effects of sexual division of labour in these relationships. There is a close link between the sexual division of labour and women's economic position. Thus, this paper sets out to highlight the fact that, despite its appearance of neutrality, the common intention approach is gender biased and effectively discriminates against female claimants. The paper will also look to the experiences of other Commonwealth jurisdictions in dealing with family property disputes. Whilst there is an excellent discussion by Gardner in respect of the Commonwealth approaches to family property disputes xiii , his analysis was not concerned with the issue of gender in these disputes. The purpose of this paper is to show how gender issues should be taken into account when dealing with family property disputes and failure to do so by any doctrine applied renders it inadequate to protect the interests of female claimants. It becomes evident in the subsequent discussion that not all of the Commonwealth approaches are free from gender bias and have managed to escape the inextricable 'solid tug of money'. The study is, however, useful in elucidating options which may be less gender biased by their willingness to take into account indirect contributions, particularly domestic contributions, to ground proprietary claims.
Limits of the 'Common intention' constructive trust
Under the Rosset formulation, there are two ways in which a claimant may obtain a share in the family home. The first requires the existence of an agreement, arrangement or understanding between the parties for the sharing of property, coupled with acts of detriment on the claimant's part in reliance on such agreement.
In the absence of such express agreement, the second alternative is to infer a common intention to share from the parties' conduct. In drawing such an inference, the emphasis of the courts is on the direct financial contributions of the claimant towards the acquisition of the property. Rosset does not appear to affect the common intention and detrimental reliance. As a result, Rosset has been criticised on a number of grounds, the first of which is the common intention requirement.
Rosset is less than clear on the level of evidence required for finding the requisite intention. This has led the courts to fictionalise the intent and make contradictory findings in some cases. xv Clarke argues that if the defendant finds some 'excuse' to fob off the claimant, this clearly evidences disagreement rather than agreement.
xvi
The contradictory findings of the courts effectively convert the unilateral intention of one party (the claimant) into an agreement. Gardner further argues that the courts' willingness to stretch the facts so as to find the necessary common intention to share ends up being nothing more than an exercise in 'inventing' agreements.
xvii This has led one judge to describing it as being a 'phantom intent'.
xviii Another criticism of Rosset stems from the requirement that, in the absence of an express agreement, the contributions must be financial and directly referable to the acquisition of the property so as to give rise to an inference of common intention.
This condition effectively places little significance on indirect contributions even where such contributions are substantial. By ignoring indirect contributions, the main objection is that the principles effectively discriminate against women by making two basic assumptions. xix The first is that spouses and cohabitants are treated as strangers dealing with each other at arm's length, who will, therefore, 'bargain' for their respective shares over the family home. It imposes a commercial gloss to a relationship which is prima facie a personal one and the 'bargain' is interpreted as the first condition of common intention. The second assumption is that value cannot be attached to the domestic services provided by the claimant. The discriminatory effect of the law clearly manifests itself here, as it fails to take into account the effects of sexual division of labour in these relationships. The law further assumes that families function as egalitarian economic units whereby the parties have an equal say in both the allocation and management of the household income and decision-making. The parties can, therefore, 'bargain' for their respective shares in the property through the allocation of household income directly towards its acquisition. Any other form of allocation of the household income, especially the woman's income, will draw the conclusion of a non-sharing intent by the parties. Pahl notes the strong correlation between control of household finances and marital power and that a family's choice of management system is dependent on the household income level and who the main wage-earner is. xxxiv She found that management of household finances is clearly distinct from control. The partner viewed by the parties as being in control of the household finances normally plays a more dominant role in decision-making, which is directly linked to marital power.
xxxv Low income families usually prefer the female-management system which places both management and control in the woman's hands. In contrast, higher income families usually adopt a male-controlled system, even where the parties have opted for a pooling or an independent management system. xxxvi However, in low income families where finances are both female-controlled and managed, management is usually seen as a demanding chore rather than a source of power. In the absence of Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 -390' -11 -any perception of control, these women rarely see themselves as participating in marital power. Pahl, therefore, concludes that the greater the woman's contributions towards the household income, the greater her participation in decision-making and control over the household finances.
xxxvii She further notes that the earning patterns of the parties and the choice of management system have a direct effect on the family's spending pattern. The general tendency is to utilise the woman's income for the day-to-day needs of the family, such as food for the family, clothing for herself and the children, rather than acquisition of assets. xxxviii In comparison, the man would usually be responsible for all other major bills, more particularly, repair and maintenance costs of the family home and mortgage payments. Utilising the woman's earnings towards household expenses renders these contributions economically invisible since her earnings are ignored as pin money and absorbed into the household pool for covering family expenses and non-essentials. Such contributions, being classified as indirect, will not suffice to ground a proprietary claim under the current principles unless the woman is able to establish an existing agreement to share.
A further criticism of the common intention approach lies in the link between common intention and detrimental reliance. Although the basis for establishing a beneficial share is clearly the parties' common intention, that in itself is insufficient to make a claim successful. The courts may not necessarily be prepared to give effect to such intention in the absence of evidence that the claimant has acted on that intention in some way. xxxix Establishing the requisite nexus between common intention and detrimental reliance is, however, not an easy task, as can be seen Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 -390' -12 -from the three contrasting approaches taken by the judges in Grant v Edwards.
Nourse LJ adopted the 'but for' test which requires a causal connection between the agreement and the claimant's acts in establishing the requisite detrimental reliance.
Mustill LJ, on the other, took a contractual approach. The claimant's acts must be referable in some way to the agreement reached between the parties, in that, the acts were carried out in exchange for a share in the property. xl The 'joint lives' approach taken by Browne-Wilkinson V-C appears to be the least stringent. Once the common intention is established, any acts carried out by the claimant towards the parties' 'joint lives' will be treated as evidencing the requisite link. Given that the judges' statements are obiter, it is difficult to state categorically which test is authoritative.
This nexus question raises the further issue of what acts would suffice as detrimental reliance. This will depend on which test the courts will take in determining the issue. The narrower the test adopted, the higher the evidentiary requirements for establishing the requisite nexus between common intention and detrimental reliance and the acts which would justify the imposition of a constructive trust. xli The choice of test can also lead to differences in judicial construction of acts tantamount to detriment. The 'but for' test is more susceptible to value judgments by the judiciary regarding the type of activities which couples are reasonably expected to carry out in the course of a domestic relationship. In contrast, the contractual approach leaves greater autonomy to the parties to 'bargain' for which activities to be taken into account. The 'joint lives' approach appears to be the most flexible, allowing room for a wider range of activities to be taken into account as detriment. share in the property through direct financial contributions towards the acquisition of the property, the whole course of conduct between the parties must be taken into account to determine the parties' respective shares in the property. In that respect, assessment of the claimant's share need not be limited to strict resulting trust principles and may be based on constructive trust principles. A similar approach was taken in Drake v Whipp. The upshot of these cases is that, once a sufficient direct financial contribution has been made so as to enable the courts to draw an inference of sharing intent and get a claim off the ground, there is wider discretion for the courts to take into account other forms of contributions, direct or indirect, as acts of detrimental reliance. It further appears that the courts have the discretion to 'sidestep' a strict resulting trust analysis and award a share to the claimant, which may be larger than her initial direct financial contribution, through a constructive trust.
Given the constraints of Rosset, the outcome in both these cases is salutary in that it manages to mitigate the harshness of Rosset and the courts appear to evince a willingness to see justice done in such cases. xlvi However, it is submitted that, despite the appearance of the courts' willingness 'to do justice', both cases continue to illustrate the inextricable 'solid tug of money'. The position remains that much depends on whether there has been a sufficient financial contribution to found a claim and even then, it remains unclear how much weight will be given to purely domestic contributions as acts of detrimental reliance. At first glance, Hammond v Mitchell xlvii may appear to be a case in point that the courts are manifesting a greater willingness to accept non-financial contributions as being sufficient acts of detriment for a claim to succeed. However, the claimant was able to establish the existence of a common intention and there is no indication of the court's willingness to be overly generous in accepting indirect contributions as being sufficient acts of detriment in the absence of such express intention. It may be further argued that the provision of unpaid services in the plaintiff's business and the claimant's support for his highly speculative business ventures were seen as sufficient acts of detriment as they were, to some extent, capable of being valued in economic terms. xlviii It is submitted that the case cannot be relied on as being authority for the proposition that the courts would be prepared to let a claim succeed purely on the basis of indirect contributions unless there is some notional agreement to share.
A further problem of linking common intention with detrimental reliance is that the courts appear to treat the doctrines of constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel as interchangeable. At first glance, there seems to be certain similarities between the two doctrines. The requirement of agreement, arrangement or some understanding between the parties to share, coupled with the need for detrimental reliance, appears similar to the requirement of assurance, reliance and detriment in estoppel. l Furthermore, common intention is required for the imposition of a constructive trust whereas the unilateral conduct of the defendant leading to an expectation of a share in the property on the claimant's part is sufficient to ground an estoppel claim.
Thus, detriment serves a different purpose in each case. This distinction is crucial and re-emphasises the importance of the proprietary nature of trusts in these disputes. In trust cases, detriment gives the claimant a proprietary interest which is enforceable against third parties, whereas detriment in estoppel cases is merely a factor which the courts take into account in deciding whether it would be unconscionable for the owner to resile from his assurance or encouragement and if so, the appropriate remedy to be granted. Until the court's decision, the claimant has no interest in the property but only a mere equity. li The approach of the courts has evidenced a blurring of the distinction between constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel. Firstly, the common intention requirement is less stringent than it first appears. The courts have evinced a willingness to impose a constructive trust in cases where there is no evidence of an actual agreement to share but merely some assurance or even an excuse being given to the claimant. Secondly, notwithstanding the purported 'all or nothing' approach, the quantification of the claimant's share has become increasingly discretionary. lii This raises the question of whether the shift towards estoppel is desirable. Eekelaar observes that the common thread is that the claimant has been led in some way by the defendant to hold a reasonable belief that (s)he is to have a share in the property. liii He argues that estoppel is a more attractive alternative as the doctrine allows greater flexibility for domestic services to be taken into account as acts of detrimental reliance.
Haytonliv has, on the other hand, argued in favour of the assimilation of constructive trusts with proprietary estoppel on the grounds that the theoretical distinctions between the two doctrines are illusory and the courts should stop 'pigeon-holing circumstances into constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel'. lv The purpose of the court's intervention is to protect the claimant's detrimental reliance, rather than compel the other party to give effect to the expectation of a share. This entails assessing the parties' relationship to ascertain whether there are circumstances which make it unconscionable for the defendant to assert his legal title absolutely. The discussion so far shows that gender bias is evident in this area of the law. It remains invisible because the law recognises formal equality between the parties to own property. This is reflected by seemingly neutral concepts in the common intention approach, such as intention and the referability rule which emphasises financial contributions. Yet these concepts work in an insidious way to discriminate against women because they fail to take into account the effects of sexual division of labour on the earning capacity of women and how this will, in turn, limit their control and decision-making role in respect of the household finances. The evidence reveals that the trend is towards a male-controlled system, especially where the man's income is higher than the woman's. Given the parties' unequal access to the family wealth, women will generally find it harder than men to satisfy the requirements of the common intention approach. The significance of these arguments appears as well in the discussion on the assimilation of constructive trusts with estoppel. The main argument favouring assimilation is the flexibility of estoppel to take into account indirect contributions, especially non-financial contributions, as sufficient acts of detrimental reliance. Thus, by shifting towards estoppel, claimants may dispense with the onerous task of establishing the requisite common intention. However, it is submitted that an assimilation of constructive trusts with estoppel will not remove the gender bias in the common intention approach unless the analysis is prepared to take into account how sexual division of labour and the economic disparity between men and women will impact on the type of contributions which each party can make towards the relationship. The purported flexibility of estoppel depends very much on a generous judicial treatment of nonfinancial contributions as sufficient acts of detriment.
The Commonwealth approaches
It has been argued so far that the common intention approach is unsatisfactory as it places women at a disadvantage as a result of the effects of sexual division of labour in domestic relationships. This raises the question of what changes should be made in order to render the law less gender bias. Falling short of legislative intervention, it would appear that equity is still the more appropriate legal instrument to deal with family property disputes. However, in view of the arguments raised against the common intention approach, should the English courts emulate other Gardner came to the conclusion that those approaches were equally problematic as the common intention approach. lxiv The common thread in the various doctrines applied is the parties' thinking which, Gardner argues, is inappropriate as parties in a domestic relationship normally deal with each other on the basis of trust and collaboration rather than organised thinking. He suggests that the principles to be applied in family property disputes should be reformulated to incorporate these values, thereby enabling the courts to obtain the desired results without the need for manipulating facts and fabricating common intention.
It is, however, submitted that, if put to the test, trust and collaboration may be equally vacuous concepts, susceptible to value judgment by judges as to what types of conduct may be reasonably expected of the parties in a trusting and collaborative relationship so as to amount to detriment. This approach will not be too different from the quasi-marital approach which the courts are presently taking wherein redress is given to a claimant whom the court views as being comparable to the 'good wife'. Gardner's analysis fails to take on the challenge of gender bias and its impact on the economic position of the parties. The discourse must take into account these issues in order for less gender biased principles to be formulated.
Based on the empirical evidence of the effects of sexual division of labour and the economic disparity of men and women, the aim at this juncture is to investigate whether adopting all or any of the Commonwealth approaches will necessarily render the English law in this area more (or less) gender bias than the common intention approach. arrangements which were purely domestic. The claimant had made contributions which were both financial (in terms of pooled earnings) and non-financial (in terms of domestic services). There was further evidence that the pooled funds had facilitated the purchase of the property. The court found in favour of the claimant on the basis that the contributions were made for the parties' joint relationship which has failed and that it would be unconscionable for the defendant to retain the benefit of those contributions. At first glance, this approach appears to give the courts greater flexibility in granting equitable relief than the common intention approach. It also appears to allow greater room for indirect contributions to be taken into account. Even then, there must be a proprietary link between the unjust enrichment and the property to justify such an award. The basis of the unjust enrichment analysis appears to be two-fold: firstly, the claimant's mistaken belief that, in supplying domestic services, she will acquire a share in the property and secondly, the The necessary link between causal connection and reasonable expectation may, however, be easily satisfied by the presumptions raised in favour of the claimant and it will be increasingly harder for a defendant to resist a proprietary claim. Unlike commercial cases where the emphasis is on the causal connection and inadequacy of monetary compensation, the courts' treatment of family cases appears to be more generous. They evince a greater willingness to impose a constructive trust, despite Firstly, the nature of domestic relationships requires the causal connection requirement in domestic cases to be less stringent than in commercial cases.
Secondly, while the parties in a commercial transaction assume a certain level of risk, the acceptance of risk in domestic relationships is generally absent. Thus, the courts' willingness to grant a proprietary remedy stems from the reasonable expectations of the parties that the contributions are being made towards the joint relationship, thereby entitling the claimant to a share in the property. This willingness may also be partially due to the fact that the courts recognise the remedial nature of the constructive trust in these cases, which will not affect the prior claims of third parties.
By taking into account domestic contributions, it has been suggested that the unjust enrichment approach is a more realistic acknowledgement of familial relationships as a common enterprise. lxxxvii Each member contributes to the relationship according to his or her abilities and the needs of the other members of the household. If the relationship subsequently breaks down, the property ought to be distributed according to these contributions, whether direct or indirect, financial or non-financial.
Criticisms of gender bias brought about by sexual division of labour and the weaker economic position of women in terms of making direct financial contributions and/or the allocation of the household income towards the acquisition of the property are markedly reduced if the doctrine provides greater scope for the recognition of indirect contributions, especially domestic services. The reduced gender bias in the unjust enrichment approach is in part facilitated by the presumptive role that Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 -390' -27 -reasonable expectations play. Notwithstanding this, the unjust enrichment approach is not completely gender neutral.
At present, the focus is on relationships which are 'tantamount to spousal'. This qualification raises two problems. The first relates to identifying relationships which will qualify. This will necessarily entail the courts' evaluation of relationships and deciding whether they are sufficiently 'marriage-like' so as to come within the scope of the doctrine. This poses a factual difficulty for the courts and the tendency will be for the courts to look at long-standing relationships as being more worthy of the courts' protection than relationships of shorter duration. Factors such as the duration of the relationship, the presence or lack of presence of children, the usage of the same family name and having a joint account may influence the courts in deciding that a particular relationship qualifies. lxxxviii The courts are equally susceptible to value judgments in determining whether the relationship is sufficiently spousal-like.
Unless the claimant can pass this first hurdle, the issue of her contributions being an unjust enrichment does not even arise.
The second problem is whether the analysis will apply to other types of relationships.
The couples in all these cases are heterosexual and the courts have consistently referred to relationships tantamount to spousal. It remains to be seen whether the courts will be prepared to extend this principle to other relationships, for example, homosexual couples or couples who share a household but do not have a sexual relationship. The unjust enrichment approach will be of limited effect if the courts continue to make a distinction between relationships which they perceive as being spousal-like and those which are not. In that respect, the common intention Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 -390' -28 -approach, despite its criticisms of gender bias, may be a more flexible approach with its ability to include a wider range of relationships.
(c) New Zealand -reasonable expectations
Gillies v Keogh lxxxix paved the way for the 'reasonable expectations' approach which the New Zealand courts have adopted in dealing with family property disputes. In Gillies v Keogh, there was evidence that, throughout the relationship, the defendant had made it clear to the plaintiff that she viewed the properties as being her own. Consequently, the court found in favour of the defendant on the basis that there had been no reasonable expectations on the part of the plaintiff which justified the court's intervention. The court observed that the common thread in these cases is the reasonable expectations of the parties. In formulating these expectations, the courts will have to consider certain factors. The first is the 'degree of sacrifice made by the claimant', which may include 'opportunities foregone'. This is also used as a yardstick in assessing the unjust enrichment of the defendant.
Secondly, the court will consider 'the value of broadly measurable contributions of the claimant by comparison with the broadly measurable value of the benefits received'. In that respect, the court recognised that contributions towards the household expenses and food and other domestic services may have little significance and may at times be treated as being no more than a fair exchange for free board and lodging. It is also clear that the parties may 'contract out' of the reasonable expectations approach, as in Gillies v Keogh.
Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 -390' -29 - Alternatively, the contribution by its provision must assist the defendant in acquiring, improving or maintaining the property or its value. In that respect, domestic contributions may qualify as contributions towards acquisition of the home. However, the contributions must manifestly exceed the benefits received. In other words, the claimant must show that (s)he has suffered some detriment or that the contributions have resulted in the enrichment of the defendant which is unjust. This is where the New Zealand courts have reiterated the fundamental difference between de facto Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 -390' -30 -relationships and marriage. The presumptive half share adopted in legal marriage does not apply in de facto relationships. Therefore, the remedy of a constructive trust is based on a clear causative link being established between the claimant's contributions and the property in dispute and the appropriate share to be awarded is dependent on the balancing of contributions made and benefits received.
Although the cases illustrate that the courts do not intend to limit qualifying contributions to purely direct and financial contributions, they also reveal two major limitations. Firstly, the weighing up of contributions against benefits received may render the remedy ineffective on a practical level. The courts are faced with the difficult task of determining the point at which the contributions actually outweigh the benefits received so as to qualify. This is particularly problematic in cases of purely 
Conclusion
The above analysis shows how the common intention approach raises problems which renders it inadequate to deal with family property disputes. The main objection is the need to find the relevant common intention to share which is rarely found in majority of domestic relationships. This has led some to argue that the process of awarding a proprietary remedy depends on the willingness of the courts to manipulate the facts in order to find the relevant intent. A further problem of the approach is its emphasis on the referability rule which focuses on direct financial contributions rather than all forms of contributions, whether direct or indirect, Commonwealth approaches show how non-financial contributions need not be such a black box in terms of grounding a proprietary claim. They reveal how doctrines dealing with family property disputes may be better formulated to accord with the reality of domestic relationships and to take into account the continued existence of sexual division of labour and the economic inequality between men and women in these relationships. Thus, the Commonwealth approaches reveal two important Part of the problem of the common intention approach may be as stated by Halliwell.
In searching for legal clarity, the English courts may have become too rule-oriented as reflected by the rigid interpretation of Rosset and, in particular, the requirement for direct financial contributions. Once the courts recognise that the common intention approach need not be dictated solely by the refereability rule, it allows greater flexibility for the courts to take into consideration a wider range of contributions, direct and indirect. The courts' assessment should incorporate consideration of the whole course of conduct between the parties, as well as the effects of sexual division of labour in the relationship and how that may impact on the claimant's resources in terms of making contributions, whether direct or indirect, towards the relationship. By re-focusing on these issues, it may pave the way for a principled basis of deciding family property disputes which is less gender bias. x.. In both Eves and Grant v Edwards, the defendants had given excuses to the plaintiffs for not sharing the legal title in the properties and the plaintiffs had made indirect contributions rather than direct financial contributions. However, the courts construed the fact that excuses had to be given for not sharing the legal title as evidence of some common intention to share. 
